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Abstract—Security in wireless sensor networks is critical due
to its way of open communication. Local monitoring is one of
the powerful technique to secure the data and detect various
malicious activities. In local monitoring, neighbour nodes observe
the communication between current sender, current receiver and
next hop receiver to detect the malicious activity. To make sensors
power efficient, sleep-wake scheduling algorithms along with local
monitoring are suggested in literature. Solutions in the literature
do not address the problem if source node is malicious and do
not consider unnecessary wake up of the nodes as malicious
activity. This paper tries to achieve without assuming source
node as honest and considers unnecessary wake up of the node
as a malicious activity. Simulated the algorithm in NS-2 and
performance analysis is discussed. Even with additional checks
applied to detect malicious activities, analytical results show no
degradation in the performance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A wireless sensor network (WSN) consists of spatially
distributed autonomous devices having sensing and commu-
nication capability to cooperatively monitor physical or en-
vironmental conditions, such as temperature, pressure, sound,
vibration, motion or pollutants. Wireless sensor networks are
used in environmental conditions where information is difficult
to access. Sensor node, also known as a ’mote’, is a node in
a wireless sensor network that is capable of performing some
processing, gathering sensory information and communicating
with other connected nodes in the network. Sensor network
transmits the data from one node to another node in an adhoc
way and finally to a base station where the data is stored,
processed and displayed.
Sensor nodes can be deployed either in a controlled en-
vironment or in a uncontrolled environment. In the uncon-
trolled environments, the sensor networks are vulnerable to
a wide range of security attacks. Attackers can eavesdrop
on radio transmissions, inject data in the channel, replay
previously heard packets, drop the packets which supposed
to be transmitted and many more. Attackers may deploy a few
malicious nodes with similar or better hardware capabilities as
the legitimate nodes that might collude to attack and disrupt
the system cooperatively. The attacker may come upon these
malicious nodes by purchasing them separately, or by ”turning”
a few legitimate nodes by capturing them and physically
overwriting their memory. Also, in some cases colluding nodes
might have good-quality communication channels available for
coordinating their attack. Sensor nodes may not be tamper
resistant and if an adversary compromises a node, one can
extract all key information, data, and program stored on that
node.
Cryptographic techniques alone are not sufficient to protect
the data. Attacks such as wormhole, rushing attacks can be
launched without the help of cryptographic keys. In order
to provide security to wireless sensor networks a technique
called local monitoring has been used in literature. In lo-
cal monitoring, designated nodes observe part of the traffic
going in and out of their neighbours. The designated nodes
at each hop of packet transmission are also called guard
nodes. Guard node does different types of checks locally
on the observed traffic to make a consensus determination
of malicious behaviour of a node. Though local monitoring
can be used as powerful technique for enhancing security of
WSNs, it consumes more energy since the monitoring node is
continuously awake to oversee the network activity. So in order
to optimize the energy overhead of monitoring and maintaining
the effectiveness of monitoring service Energy Aware Local
Monitoring (ELMO)[1] has been used. ELMO uses sleep wake
scheduling technique for monitoring purpose. It provides the
same level of security that was attained with local monitoring
[2] and avoids the unnecessary awake of node.
In ELMO, the malicious behaviour of sending unwanted
wake up signals to a node is not addressed and also source
node is assumed to be honest. In ELMO, whenever a source
node wants to transmit data packet to a destination node, it
sends wake up signals to its neighbours and then transmit data
to next hop without checking whether the monitoring (guard)
nodes are actually activated or not. In the proposed SDLM
system, i) the guard nodes send an acknowledgement to sender
indicating that they are activated, ii) unnecessary wakeup of
nodes without sending the actual data is treated as a malicious
activity, iii) guard nodes also observes the source node for the
malicious activity. The SDLM system is an improved method
on the existing local monitoring technique called ELMO. We
achieved SDLM with additional checks to detect the malicious
behaviour and keeping the checks of ELMO intact.
We provide a theoretical performance analysis showing
the comparison between the ELMO and our approach SDLM
with various parameters. Even though we have added ad-
ditional checks to detect the malicious activity, there is no
degradation in the performance. The rest of the paper is
organized as follows, section 2 discusses about the related
work, section 3 describes the background of local monitoring
and problem statement, section 4 presents the solution and
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algorithm, section 5 provides the performance analysis and
results, and section 6 concludes the work and discusses the
future challenges.
II. RELATED WORK
Local monitoring is a popular technique to provide security
in WSNs. LITEWORP [2] provided a lightweight countermea-
sure for wormhole attack and suitable for resource constrained
multi-hop networks. SLAM [3] approach used local monitoring
for detecting the data attacks and integrated the local moni-
toring with sleep wake protocol. SLAM partially addressed
the problem of combining local monitoring and sleep-wake
protocol under the assumption that malicious nodes does not
have any ability to control the transmission power level. In
[4] author proposed a protocol called DICAS that mitigates
the data attacks by detecting, diagnosing, and isolating the
malicious nodes. DICAS uses the ability of a node to oversee
its neighboring nodes communication. In [5] author proposed a
protocol called SECOS that mitigates the data attack problems
in static sensor networks. SECOS divides the sensor nodes into
control groups, each group with a control node. Data exchange
between nodes within a control group happens through the
control head which provides the common key. The keys
are changed periodically and the control nodes are chosen
periodically to enhance security. Lot of work carried out in
the literature and shown that local monitoring is a feasible
approach to counter data attacks [6], [7].
However, the application of local monitoring interferes
with sleep-wake scheduling. In the ELMO [1] approach au-
thor addressed the problem of combining local monitoring
(to support security) and sleep-wake scheduling (to conserve
energy) under the no assumption that a malicious node have
the ability to control its transmission power level. ELMO
approach considered scheduling of the monitoring nodes with
the goal of additional energy savings. ELMO provided the first
methodology for enabling energy-efficient local monitoring in
multi-hop wireless sensor networks.
III. BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM DEFINITION
In local monitoring neighbour nodes observe the data
reception and forwarding from a node and decides the ma-
licious behaviour based on certain conditions. Among the
neighbour nodes, there are designated nodes which satisfy the
guard selection criteria [1] participates in the observation and
malicious activity detection.
In the figure 1, n1 is the source node trying to transmit
data to nh node, where nh is the destination node over h-
1 hops distance. Guard nodes are identified at every hop.
Guard nodes satisfy the below conditions. 1. If n1 transmitting
data to n2 , GN(n2) = {n1, g2, g3} where GN(n2) is
set of guard nodes participate in the observation on n2’s
behaviour and GN(n2) = R(n1)ΩR(n2)− n2. Where R(n1)
is radio range of n1 and R(n2) is the radio range of n2.
R(n1) = {n1, g1, g2, g3}, R(n2) = {n2, g2, g3, g4, g5}. 2.
Distance between n2 & gi should be greater than the distance
between n2 & n3. This is to detect the attacks by adjusting
the transmission power level control.
Each guard node has a watch buffer used to store the
information for each packet sent from packets immediate
Fig. 1. network model
sender to packets immediate receiver. For example, if n1 is
transmitting data to n2, the guard nodes g2 and g3 stores
information for each packet sent from n1 to n2 in its watch
buffers. The information includes source, destination, packets
immediate sender, packets immediate receiver, first hop of
packets immediate receiver, data which is transmitted and
the current time. Each entry in the watch buffer has a time
threshold, by which the packets immediate receiver must
forward the packet unless that one itself is the destination.
Each packet forwarded by the packets immediate receiver is
checked for the corresponding information in the watch buffer
by guard nodes.
At each guard node gi a malicious counter is maintained for
a node nj . Whenever the guard node gi detects the malicious
activity of node nj the malicious counter is incremented.
The increment of malicious counter depends on the nature of
the malicious activity detected. A node is determined to be
misbehaving only if the malicious counter value goes above
a threshold value. Then guard node gi removes nj from its
neighbour list and sends a warning message to each neighbour
of nj indicating that nj is a suspected malicious node. Then
all the neighbours of nj , removes nj from its neighbouring
list, and isolates nj by marking nj’s status as revoked in the
neighbour list. After isolation the neighbour nodes does not
send or accept any packet to a revoked node.
System Assumptions: SDLM assumes the network is
static and the links are bidirectional. SDLM assumes that
network nodes have pre-distributed keys for encryption and
data communication as discussed in [8]. In SDLM each node
knows the current (X,Y) location and also the location of the
neighbour nodes. Malicious behaviour is manifested through
delaying, dropping, fabricating, misrouting or modifying pack-
ets. In general most of the local monitoring algorithms assume
that the nodes in the network are dense and suitable set of
neighbouring nodes are available to become the guard nodes.
Goal of the SDLM is to detect the malicious behaviour
of the source node such as unnecessary wake up of the
neighbouring nodes without having the data to transmit or with
the bad intention of draining the power of the neighbouring
nodes with unnecessary wakeup. Current sending node also
have the confirmation from guard nodes whether they actually
woke up to observe the malicious behaviour of current receiver
by receiving the acknowledgement from each guard node.
IV. SDLM
The main design goal of SDLM is to find out the malicious
activity of sending unwanted wake up signals to a node with
the purpose of wasting the energy of nodes in the network.
SDLM also checks whether the guard nodes are actually woke
up or not before sending data to a node. We use figure.1 to
illustrate SDLM. Whenever source node n1 wants to transmit
data to a destination node nh through an h-1 hop route n1 →
n2 →......nh−1 → nh, SDLM uses the following technique.
Node n1 wakes up by itself and broadcasts wake up
beacon to all its neighbours. Each neighbour of n1 after being
awakened sends an acknowledgement back to the sender (n1)
indicating that each of them are now in active mode. Then
the neighbour nodes determine whether to stay awake or go
back to sleep mode depending on the role it plays in the data
transmission. If the neighbour node is the next hop in the
ongoing communication then it stays awake to receive data
and to monitor the next communication link. If the neighbour
node is a guard node then also it stays awake to monitor the
communication link. To check whether a node is guard node or
not it runs guard selection algorithm [1]. All other neighbour
nodes go back to sleep mode.
SDLM checks whether a node sends unwanted wake up
signal or not in addition to other malicious activities. In order
to do that a node after being awakened wait for a particular
time threshold (Tth) for getting a data packet from the node
that sends wake up signal to it. If it does not get any data
packets within Tth then it broadcasts a two hop warning
message indicating that sender is doing a malicious activity.
Then all the nodes that are in wake up mode will go back to
sleep mode.
If the source node is honest it sends data packets to n2.
Node n2, guards of n2 (n1, g2 and g3) have to continue
listening the communication link for a maximum of time Tw
(watch buffer time threshold). Each time a new packet is send
from n1 to n2, Tw is initialized again. The nodes after being
awakened go back to sleep mode whenever the time threshold
Tw expires. The guard nodes g2 and g3 check whether there is
any malicious activity carried out by the node n2 as explained
in section 3. Here the guard nodes identify four types of
malicious activities: delay, misrouting, modification and no
awakening of guard nodes [1]. If the node n2 is honest it
does the same steps as n1 did to wake up its guards (g4 and
g5) and the next hop (n3). If node n2 does not send wake up
signal, the guards of node n2 with lowest ID sends a two hop
wake up signal. If that guard fails then next guard with lowest
ID sends wake up signal and so on. This process continues
until the packet reaches destination.
Notations
Ns: source node
Nd: destination node
NOH: method which provides the number of hops between a
pair of nodes
NBi: neighbours of node i
sigWP: wake up signal
ACK: acknowledgement
NH(i): next hop from i while transmitting data packet
MODE(i) : represents whether the node is in SLEEP mode or
WAKE UP mode
GUARDNH(i): represents guard nodes to monitor the
behaviour of NH(i)
warMSG: warning message
Tth: threshold time
ALGORITHM
SDLM( Ns,Nd)
1. L= NOH(Ns,Nd)
2. If L>1 then
3. i=Ns
a. Do
i. For each j in NBi
1. sigWP to j from i
2. If MODE(j) = WAKE UP
a. ACK to i from j
ii. End for
iii. If NBi=NH(i) then
1. MODE(NBi)= WAKE UP
iv. If NBi=GUARDNH(i) then
1. MODE(NBi)= WAKE UP
v. Else
1. MODE(NBi)= SLEEP
1. Two hop warMSG from GUARDNH(i)
2. MODE(NBi,i) = SLEEP
vii. Else
1. NH(i) receive data from i
2. If time !=Tw then
a. MODE(i,GUARDNH(i)= WAKE UP
viii. i=NH(i)
b. While(i!=Nd)
4. End
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
The effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed scheme
are evaluated in the ns-2 simulator. we have compared SDLM
the proposed approach with the ELMO [1]. 100 nodes are ran-
domly deployed in a square area. Each node acts as a source.
The malicious nodes are selected at random. Any pair of nodes
can act as source and destination, if the source/destination pair
is more than two hops apart. Even with additional malicious
activity detection, SDLM achieved the results intact with
ELMO. In order to find out the worst case end to end delay of
SDLM, we compared it with ELMO. End to end delay is the
time taken for a data packet to reach the final destination. Since
ELMO and SDLM uses a sleep wake scheduling technique for
local monitoring, the end-to-end delay of these two techniques
is always higher compared to other monitoring techniques
without sleep-wake scheduling. The end-to-end delay imposed
by SDLM depends on the number of hops between the source
and destination. As shown in Figure 2 the end-to-end delay
of ELMO and SDLM increases linearly with the number of
hops. In SDLM delay is little higher than that of ELMO
since in this technique a node transmits data only after getting
acknowledgement from guard nodes.
Fig. 2. end to end delay
A. Average Energy Balance
We also analyze the energy balance of sensor nodes with
the proposed scheme in WSN. Since the energy consumption
is mainly due to continuous monitoring of guard nodes to
oversee the network activity, here we are using a sleep wake
scheduling technique for monitoring. In SDLM nodes that are
involved in current communication link (i.e. sender, receiver
and the corresponding guard nodes) are awake and all other
nodes are asleep. Figure 3 shows the average energy balance
Fig. 3. Average Energy Balance
of nodes when we are conducting simulation experiments on
ELMO and SDLM. In both cases the performance is almost
same since both techniques uses the sleep wake scheduling
technique. In the figure it is shown that the average energy
balance of nodes slightly decreases as time increases. This
makes SDLM more energy efficient as SDLM handles better
security check compare to ELMO.
B. Percent Delivery Ratio
It indicates the percentage of the transmitted data packets
that are successfully received. Firstly the total number of
transmitted packets are counted, followed by the total number
of received packets and the total number of dropped packets.
The delivery ratio is calculated as the percent of packets
received to the packets transmitted.
% delivery ratio= (No. of packets received / No. of packets
transmitted)*100
Fig. 4. Percent Delivery Ratio
Figure 4 shows the variations of percent delivery ratio as
we vary the number of malicious nodes. Here we compare the
percent delivery ratio of ELMO and SDLM. The performances
of both techniques are almost same. It is shown that the percent
delivery ratio slightly decreases as the number of malicious
nodes increases. This is because some of the packets are
dropped before the malicious nodes are detected and isolated.
As the number of malicious nodes increases, the initial packets
dropping also increases so the percent delivery ratio decreases.
C. Percent Isolation
It indicates the percentage of malicious nodes in the
network that are isolated as a fraction of total number of
malicious nodes.
% isolation= (No. of malicious nodes isolated/ No. of
malicious nodes) * 100
Figure 5 shows the variations of percent isolation as we
vary the number of malicious nodes. Here we compare the
percent isolation of ELMO and SDLM. The performances of
both techniques are almost same. It is shown that the percent
Fig. 5. Percent Isolation
isolation slightly decreases as the number of malicious nodes
increases. This is because number of guard nodes decreases as
the number of malicious nodes increases.
D. Percent Wakeup Time
It indicates the time a node has to be awake to do
monitoring all the nodes as a percentage of simulation time.
Here we compare the energy savings of SDLM with ELMO.
Fig. 6. Percent Wakeup Time
The performances of both techniques are almost same. Figure
6 shows the extra time a node needs to be awake for monitoring
in SDLM and ELMO as we vary the detection confidence
index. From the figure it is shown that the percent wake up time
increases linearly as we increase detection confidence index.
This is because if we increase detection confidence index
[1] the number of guard nodes that are used for monitoring
purpose also increases there by the extra time a node needs to
be awake for monitoring purpose also increases.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Local monitoring approach detects various kinds of mali-
cious activities. SDLM achieved the detection of source node
malicious activity and unwanted wake up malicious activities
along with the malicious activities detected by ELMO. Based
on the obtained performance results, SLDM performs better
than ELMO. In Local Monitoring techniques, guard nodes
themselves can inject many malicious activities. Need further
analysis on identifying the malicious guard nodes and miti-
gating the security attacks from guard nodes along with local
monitoring techniques.
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